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Abstract
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost
information. In contrast to previous studies, we assume demand is in-
fluenced by a quality choice, and the firm has private information about
its quality capacity in addition to its cost. Under natural conditions,
asymmetric information about the quality capacity is irrelevant. The op-
timal pricing is weakly above marginal costs for all types and no type is
excluded.
JEL: D82, L21, Asymmetric Information, Multi-dimensional Screening,
Regulation.
1 Introduction
When duplication of fixed costs is wasteful, a service is efficiently provided by
a natural monopoly. To keep the service provider from abusing its monopoly
power, the pricing of the firm is regulated. If the regulator had access to the
firm’s information, price regulation would be a trivial matter. As is well known,
the firm should follow a marginal cost pricing rule and should be subsidized for
the losses it makes on a lump-sum basis. However, the problem is precisely that
the firm has better information than the regulator has about payoff relevant
circumstances. Baron and Myerson [1982] first analyzed this problem when the
firm’s costs are unknown to the regulator but known to the firm. Marginal cost
∗We thank Paul Beaudry, Claudio Mezzetti, and Benny Moldovanu for helpful con-
versations. Correspondence can be sent to the authors at the Economics Department,
University of Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, or to
c.blackorby@warwick.ac.uk and dezso.szalay@warwick.ac.uk.
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pricing is no longer optimal as this rule gives firms with relatively low marginal
costs incentives to exaggerate their costs in order to get larger subsidies. To
make such exaggeration unattractive, prices are distorted upwards for all but
the most efficient firms.
While cost conditions are an important source of firms’ private information
they are not the only one. Indeed, it is primarily for analytical convenience
rather than economic reasoning that we usually model firms as being better
informed about a single parameter (marginal costs or fixed costs) rather than
a vector of parameters. However, firms being closer to consumers than the
regulator, they naturally have a better access to information about demand
conditions in addition to their information about costs. Thus, it is quite natural
to think of the regulation problem in a world of (at least) two-dimensional
asymmetric information. How important is this change of perspective? In other
words, how different are the optimal pricing rules arising in the new situation?
Lewis and Sappington [1988] have proposed a model to address this question.
They assume that the firm knows the intercept of a linear demand function and
the value of its marginal cost parameter, while the regulator does not have any
of this information. Under a particular verifiability assumption, they demon-
strate that this problem is amenable to techniques developed in Laffont, Maskin
and Rochet [1987]. In particular, the regulator has only one instrument - the
marginal price - to screen firms, but information has two dimensions. Hence,
firms whose demand and cost parameter add up to the same value of a cer-
tain statistic (in that case, simply the sum of the parameters) behave the same
way; that is, these firms are bunched together. They show that optimal pricing
is strikingly different in this world; some firms are induced to set prices below
marginal costs. This problem was later reinvestigated by Armstrong [1999], clar-
ifying that the optimal pricing policy in the Lewis and Sappington [1988] model
should induce exclusion of certain high cost-low demand firms. Technically, ex-
clusion is optimal because the density of the sum of two random variables goes
to zero at the bounds of its support. Armstrong [1996] shows that exclusion
is robust in these kind of settings under more general assumptions. However,
Armstrong [1999] confirms in a two-by-two-type model that optimal pricing can
indeed be below marginal costs for some types in this context. The direction
of the distortions relative to the first-best allocation depends on the particular
pattern of binding incentive constraints; this is in contrast to the one dimen-
sional case where the binding incentive constraints are always those inhibiting
low cost firms from exaggerating their costs.
We study the regulation problem when the firm has demand and cost in-
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formation, but we depart from the Lewis-Sappington model in an important
way. To add asymmetric information about demand in an interesting way, the
Lewis-Sappington-Armstrong model assumes that the regulator cannot verify
the quantity consumers buy. Otherwise, the regulator could simply infer de-
mand information from observing the price the firm sets and the quantity that
is demanded by consumers. On the other hand, the regulator needs to be able
to verify whether or not the consumers’ demand has been satisfied. We find
this verifiability assumption hard to justify in general, and hence that an inves-
tigation under different verifiability standards is interesting. In particular, we
assume that the realized demand function is observable, but the firm has private
information about its ability to shift the demand function upwards. The firm
produces a service of observable quantity and quality, but given an observed
quality, the regulator does not know whether the firm would have been capable
of delivering the good in still higher quality. In addition to that, the firm’s profit
is unobservable to the regulator, so information about costs poses non-trivial
problems as well.
We show that this seemingly small departure from the original model in a
natural direction has dramatic effects on the optimal pricing scheme and the
participation of firms. Neither is there pricing below marginal costs, nor is there
exclusion of firms. The reason for these differences is that the regulator now
has two instruments to screen firms (the marginal price and the quality choice)
and that the firms ability to produce quality enters the incentive problem in a
way that has not been analyzed widely so far. The firms ability puts an upper
bound on what the firm is able to do, so it enters the firm’s problem through
a constraint rather than directly. The most surprising result we are able to
establish is that, under reasonable conditions, private information about the
ability to produce quality does not affect the solution of the screening problem.
If the regulator acts as if he knew this piece of information, and offers a family
of price-quality-subsidy menus, each one conditional on the firm’s ability pa-
rameter, then the firm voluntarily selects into the right menu. The reason firms
agree to share this piece of information is that they receive a weakly higher
rent for revealing their cost information. This arises at the optimum if higher
quality-ability firms produce higher amounts of quantity, which in turn is op-
timal for the regulator provided that quantity and quality are complements to
the consumer and the quality-ability and cost parameters are affiliated. We ex-
tend our analysis in a number of directions that depart from these assumptions.
Provided that the distribution of types has full support, none of these results
feature pricing below marginal costs nor exclusion of firms.
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Our study is related to a growing literature on multi-dimensional screening.
Most related in terms of the techniques employed is our own taxation paper,
Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay [2008]. Closest in terms of focus - the Lewis and
Sappington [1988] and Armstrong [1999] papers notwithstanding - is Matthews
and Moore [1987]. The main difference to Matthews and Moore is that in their
paper information is one-dimensional but there are two instruments to choose;
in our paper both information and the set of instruments is two-dimensional.
Other studies in multi-dimensional screening include McAfee and MacMillan
[1988], and Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti [1999]. Wilson [1993] offers a
general solution (the demand profile approach) to the multi-dimensional pricing
problem. The most general results to date have been obtained by Armstrong
[1996] and Rochet and Chone´ [1998]. In addition there are two useful surveys
of these multidimensional problems—Armstrong and Rochet [1999] and Rochet
and Stole [2003].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section two we lay out the model,
explain the regulator’s problem and explain its solution for the case where the
regulator has perfect information. In Section three, we study the case where the
regulator knows the firms’ quality capacity, but does not have access to the firm’s
cost information. We show that our problem is nicely amenable to monotone
comparative statics methods, and we use these methods to investigate how the
pricing policy depends on the firm’s quality capacity. In Section four, we address
the full problem when the regulator knows neither the cost parameter nor the
firm’s quality capacity. Depending on the support of the quality information
and on the joint-distribution of quality capacity and marginal costs, we are able
to fully characterize the optimal pricing policy. The final section concludes. All
proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
Consumers’ valuations for a quantity x of a good whose quality is q are described
by the downward sloping inverse demand function P (x, q) .We assume that, for
any q, P (·, q) ranges from zero to infinity, as would be the case for a constant
elasticity demand function. Define the gross consumer surplus of a consumer
who buys x units of a good of quality q at a constant marginal price as
V (x, q) ≡
x∫
0
P (z, q) dz.
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The consumer values higher x and q in the sense that Vx (x, q) > 0 for all x and
q and Vq (x, q) > 0 for all x > 0 and q. The good is produced by a monopoly firm
subject to price regulation. The firm’s cost of producing the good in quantity
x and quality q is
C (x, q, θ, η) =
{
C (x, q, θ) for q ≤ η
∞ for q > η.
where θ and η are parameters that are known only to the firm but not to the reg-
ulator. θ shifts the cost function on the relevant domain upwards, Cθ (x, q, θ) > 0
for all θ and x, q > 0. Costs are strictly increasing in x and weakly increasing
in q, that is Cx (x, q, θ) > 0 and Cq (x, q, θ) ≥ 0 for all x, q, θ such that x > 0.
We note that the differentiability of surplus and costs with respect to x and θ is
crucial for our approach; the differentiability with respect to q is not and could
be dispensed with at the cost of additional notational clutter.
η defines an upper bound on qualities that the firm is capable of producing.
x and q are verifiable; hence contracts can be written on these variables. The
parameters θ and η are known only to the firm; the regulator knows only the
joint distribution of these variables. θ, η are distributed on a product set Θ×H
with probability density function f (θ, η) > 0 for all θ, η. The set Θ is taken as
the interval
[
θ, θ
]
throughout the paper, where θ > 0. The set H can either be
discrete or continuous. In the latter case we take it as the interval
[
η, η
]
where
η > 0. Let G (η) denote the cdf of η. Given our full support assumption, for
each η that has dG (η) > 0, the conditional distribution of θ given η has full
support. The density of this distribution is denoted f (θ |η ) .
The firm is subject to price and quality regulation. If it sets a marginal price
p and produces a quality q then it receives a subsidy t and its profit is for q ≤ η
t+ pX (p, q)− C (x, q, θ) ,
where X (p, q) is the direct demand function for the good which is assumed to be
downward sloping, Xp (p, q) < 0. For q > η, the profit becomes minus infinity.
Define the sum of consumer and producer surplus as
S (x, q, θ) ≡ V (x, q)− C (x, q, θ) for q ≤ η.
We place the following assumptions on the joint surplus function. First, we
assume that S (x, q, θ) satisfies the single crossing condition in x, θ : for all x, θ
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and all q ≤ η
Sxθ (x, q, θ) = −Cxθ (x, q, θ) < 0, (1)
a standard sorting condition. Second, we assume that S (x, q, θ) satisfies the
boundary condition, for all θ and all q > 0
lim
x→0
Sx (x, q, θ) =∞. (2)
Fourth, the surplus function is strictly concave in x and q. For all x, θ, and q ≤ η
Sxx (x, q, θ) , Sqq (x, q, θ) < 0, and Sxx (x, q, θ)Sqq (x, q, θ)− (Sxq (x, q, θ))2 > 0.
(3)
2.1 The Regulator’s Problem
We think of the regulator’s problem in term’s of a direct revelation mechanism,
which is a triple of functions {q (θ, η) , p (θ, η) , t (θ, η)} for all (θ, η) ∈ Θ×H that
satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. Given p (θ, η) , q (θ, η), consumers
make their consumption decisions resulting in demandX (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) .1 The
regulator maximizes a weighted sum of net consumer surplus and producer
surplus under incentive constraints. If a firm announces costs θˆ and quality
capacity ηˆ, where q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
> η, then its profits are minus infinity; if it announces
a type such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η, then its profits are given by
Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
≡ t(θˆ, ηˆ)+p(θˆ, ηˆ)X (p(θˆ, ηˆ), q(θˆ, ηˆ))−C(X (p(θˆ, ηˆ), q(θˆ, ηˆ)) , q(θˆ, ηˆ), θ).
Under a truthful mechanism, the weighted joint surplus for a given pair (θ, η)
is equal to
W (θ, η) ≡ V
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)
)
, q
(
θ, η
))− p (θ, η)X(p (θ, η) , q(θ, η))
−t (θ, η) + αΠ(θ, θ, η)
where α ∈ (0, 1) . Since α is kept constant throughout the paper, we suppress
the dependence of the welfare function on α in what follows. We let Θ and H
denote the random variables with typical realizations θ and η, respectively, and
let EΘH denote the expectation operator taken over the random variables Θ and
1Although it is useful to begin with the instruments p, q and t, it will become clear
below that one can actually think of the problem as of choosing a triple of functions
{q (θ, η) , x (θ, η) , t (θ, η)} , where x (θ, η) ≡ X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) .
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H. The regulator’s problem is
max
p(·,·),q(·,·),t(·,·)
EΘH
[
W (θ, η)
]
(4)
s.t. for all θ, η and all θˆ, ηˆ such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η
Π(θ, θ, η) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
, (5)
and for all θ, η
Π(θ, θ, η) ≥ 0, (6)
and
q (θ, η) ≤ η. (7)
(5) is the incentive compatibility condition, requiring that a firm of type θ, η
must have no incentive to mimic any other type which itself produces a quality
the firm is able to produce too. Which types fall in this category depends on the
allocation of qualities, q (θ, η) . Of course, the firm must also have no incentive to
mimic types such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
> η. But, the profit arising from such a choice is
equal to minus infinity, which is obviously never tempting. In fact, the constraint
(6) requires that each firm in equilibrium obtain a non-negative profit, which
is surely better than imitating a type
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
> η.2 Finally,
condition (7) requires that the allocation must be technically feasible.
Before we study the solution to this problem, we describe the first-best
allocation when types are observable.
2.2 The first-best
Since α < 1, the regulator allocates all surplus to the consumer in the first-best
allocation; the participation constraint is binding for each type, Π (θ, θ, η) = 0,
so
t (θ, η) = C (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ)− p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) . (8)
2It is important to stress that we allow each type to imitate every other type, so there is
no limit on what a firm can communicate. This technical difference is important for the proof
of the revelation principle in this context. For a formal proof that the revelation principle
applies under our verifiability assumptions, see Proposition 6 in Beaudry, Blackorby, and
Szalay [2008].
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Substituting (8) into the regulator’s objective function, we obtain
max
p(·,·),q(·,·)
EΘH
[
V
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)
)
, q (θ, η)
)
−C
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , q
(
θ, η
))
, q (θ, η) , θ
)]
Given the boundary condition (2) and that the surplus function is concave in x
and q, (3) , the optimal marginal price schedule pfb (θ, η) satisfies for each θ, η
the first-order condition
Vx
(
X
(
pfb (θ, η) , q (θ, η)
)
, q (θ, η)
)
−Cx
(
X
(
pfb
(
θ, η
)
, q (θ, η)
)
, q (θ, η) , θ
)
= 0.
(9)
Moreover, the optimal quality allocation satisfies either qfb (θ, η) < η and
Vq
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , qfb (θ, η)
)
, qfb (θ, η)
)
−Cq
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , qfb (θ, η)
)
, qfb (θ, η) , θ
)
= 0,
(10)
or qfb (θ, η) = η and
Vq
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , qfb (θ, η)
)
, qfb (θ, η)
)
−Cq
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , qfb (θ, η)
)
, qfb (θ, η) , θ
)
≥ 0.
(11)
Since Vx (x, q) = P (x, q) , condition (9) states that at the optimum price should
equal marginal cost. Condition (10) states that the marginal cost of providing
quality should equal the marginal benefit of quality, unless of course the quality
bound is binding.
We now address the principal’s problem when θ and η are not observable
to him. It is useful to begin the investigation with the case where the firm can
only misrepresent its cost parameter θ, but cannot lie about the parameter η. In
this case the regulator faces a family of firms, indexed by their quality capacity
η. For each given η, the regulator faces a problem that is now familiar from the
analysis of Baron and Myerson (1982). Since the full two dimensional problem is
analytically most convenient to handle when it has certain additive separability
properties, we treat the one dimensional problem under the same assumption.
In particular, we assume that the cost function can be written as
C (x, q, θ) = c (x, θ) + k (x, q) , (12)
the important feature being that there is no interaction between θ and q.
3 The Case of Observable Quality Bounds
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If η is known, the regulator can condition his instruments on η. We let p (θ; η) ,
q (θ; η) , and t (θ; η) for all θ denote the price, quality, and transfer schedule
conditional on η and define
Π
(
θˆ, θ; η
)
≡ t
(
θˆ; η
)
+p
(
θˆ; η
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
−C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θ
)
The principal solves, for each given η, the following problem
max
p(·;η),t(·;η),q(·;η)
θ∫
θ
W (θ; η) f (θ| η) dθ (13)
subject to, for all θ, η :
Π (θ, θ; η) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ; η
)
for all θˆ, (14)
Π (θ, θ; η) ≥ 0, and (15)
q (θ; η) ≤ η. (16)
This is a standard problem and is normally solved by reformulating the incen-
tive and participation constraints. We state a more tractable version of these
constraints in the following lemma. We call a triple of pricing schedule p (θ; η) ,
quality schedule q (θ; η) , and transfer schedule t (θ; η) implementable if they
satisfy constraints (14) and (15) . Moreover, we let pi (θ; η) ≡ maxθˆ Π
(
θˆ, θ; η
)
.
Lemma 1 The price, quality, and payment schedules, p(θ; η), q (θ; η) , and t(θ; η),
are implementable if and only if
t (θ; η) = C (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ) (17)
+
θ∫
θ
cy (X (p (y; η) , q (θ; η)) , y) dy − p (θ; η)X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η))
and X (p (y; η) , q (θ; η)) is non-increasing in θ.
The first part of Lemma 1 is standard, but there are some subtle differences
to the standard case. Using envelope arguments, the equilibrium profit of the
firm is equal to pi (θ; η) =
∫ θ
θ
cy (X (p (y; η) , q (y; η)) , y) dy, which is just another
way of writing condition (17) . X has to satisfy a monotonicity condition, which
amounts— roughly speaking—to a second order condition, which is typical in
incentive problems. However, it is interesting to note that incentive compati-
bility places no restrictions on the function q (θ; η) or on the function p (θ; η) ,
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although these functions are jointly constrained to give rise to a monotonic func-
tion X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) . Additive separability of the cost function is the reason
our problem has this feature; there is no interaction between q and θ in the cost
function.
Using our assumption that the inverse demand function has full range for
all q, we can simplify the principal’s problem. For any given function q (θ; η) , we
can still induce any desired quantity of consumption scheduleX (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η))
by simply adjusting the price schedule p (θ; η) accordingly. This means we can
effectively choose the pair of quantity and quality schedules (x (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) di-
rectly, and worry about the pricing schedule that induces x (θ; η) ≡ X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η))
afterwards. Hence, substituting the expression for equilibrium profits into the
objective function, and integrating by parts, we can write the regulator’s prob-
lem as
max
x(·;η),q(·;η)
θ∫
θ
[
V (x (θ; η) , q (θ; η))− C (x (θ; η) , q (θ; η) , θ)
]
f (θ |η ) dθ (18)
−
θ∫
θ
[
(1− α) cθ (x (θ; η) , θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
]
f (θ |η ) dθ
s.t. x (θ; η) non-increasing in θ, and
q (θ; η) ≤ η for all θ.
It is customary to solve this problem imposing regularity conditions that ensure
that the monotonicity constraint is automatically satisfied at the solution to this
problem. Then, in the absence of this monotonicity constraint, the instruments
can effectively be chosen to maximize the integrand in (18) pointwise. Moreover,
the constraint set for each θ is x (θ; η) ≥ 0 and q (θ; η) ∈ [0, η] , a lattice. Let
the virtual surplus be
B (x, q, θ) ≡ V (x, q)− C (x, q, θ)− (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η ) . (19)
Notice that B (x, q, θ) is supermodular in (x, q) for each θ if and only if S (x, q, θ)
is supermodular in (x, q) . Since B (x, q, θ) is differentiable to the desired degree,
this is equivalent to Bxq (x, q, θ) ≥ 0 for all x, q, θ. Moreover, if B (x, q, θ) is
submodular in (x, q) for each θ, then, with qˆ ≡ q−1, B
(
x, 1qˆ , θ
)
is supermodular
in (x, qˆ) for each θ, because Bxqˆ
(
x, 1qˆ , θ
)
< 0 if and only if Bxq (x, q, θ) > 0.
Next consider changes in θ. We characterize their effect on B (x, q, θ) in the
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following lemma:
Lemma 2 i) B (x, q, θ) has non-increasing differences in (x, q) and θ if and
only if c (x, θ) + (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) has non-decreasing differences in x and
θ.
ii) If cxθθ(x, θ) ≥ 0, and F ( θ|η)f( θ|η) is non-decreasing in θ (and the single-crossing
condition cxθ(x, θ) ≥ 0 holds) then c (x, θ) + (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) has non-
decreasing differences in x and θ.
Complementarities in the virtual surplus function determine the compara-
tive statics properties of the maximizer set. We also want to have a unique
maximizer, as is standard in incentive theory. To this end, we will impose
B (x, q, θ) is strictly concave in (x, q) for all θ. (20)
Notice that, given S (x, q, θ) is strictly concave in (x, q) , it suffices to assume that
cθ (x, θ) is strictly convex in x to guarantee that B (x, q, θ) is strictly concave in
(x, q) for all θ.
As usual we will characterize the solution to problem (18) assuming such
a solution exists. Note that given (20) (in conjunction with the conditions
mentioned in the next proposition) the solution is unique and let it be denoted
x∗ (θ; η) and q∗ (θ; η) , respectively. We can now characterize this solution:
Proposition 1 Suppose that c (x, θ)+(1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) has non-decreasing
differences in x and θ. Then,
i) the optimal quantity schedule x∗ (θ; η) satisfies the first-order condition
Vx (x∗ (θ; η) , q (θ; η))−Cx (x∗ (θ; η) , q (θ; η) , θ)−(1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ; η) , θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η ) = 0,
(21)
and the optimal quality schedule satisfies either
q∗ (θ; η) < η and Vq (x (θ; η) , q∗ (θ; η))− Cq (x (θ; η) , q∗ (θ; η) , θ) = 0, or (22)
q∗ (θ; η) = η and Vq (x (θ; η) , η)− Cq (x (θ; η) , η, θ) ≥ 0; (23)
ii) if B (x, q, θ) is supermodular in (x, q) for each θ, x∗ (θ; η) and q∗ (θ; η) are
both non-increasing in θ and the quality capacity constraint is binding for low
values of θ if any;
iii) if B (x, q, θ) is submodular in (x, q) for each θ, x∗ (θ; η) is non-increasing
and q∗ (θ; η) is non-decreasing in θ and the quality capacity constraint is binding
for high values of η if any.
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Using Vx (x∗ (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) = P (x∗ (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) and the definition
P (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η)) ≡ p (θ; η) , we can rewrite the first-order condi-
tion (21) in terms of the optimal price-schedule p∗ (θ; η) :
p∗ (θ; η)− Cx (X (p∗ (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ)
− (1− α) cxθ (X (p∗ (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η ) = 0. (24)
The solution has the remarkable feature that for a given price schedule, the
quality schedule satisfies the same first-order condition as in the first-best. Thus,
the only distortions relative to the first-best case arise from the familiar trade-
off that causes the price schedule to be distorted away from first-best. We can
write the first-order condition as
(p (θ; η)− Cx (X (p (θ; η) , η) , η, θ)) f (θ |η ) = (1− α) cxθ (X (p (θ; η) , η) , η, θ)F (θ |η ) .
To understand our results that follow, it is useful to review the trade-off behind
the optimal pricing in some detail. On the left side we have the principal’s desire
to implement an efficient solution, which requires that price equals marginal
cost. The weight given to this motive is f (θ| η) , the likelihood of type θ| η.
On the right side appears the principal’s desire to limit the firm’s rents. A
decrease in p (θ; η) increases the rents that have to be given to all types that
are more efficient at producing than type θ| η. Since there is a mass F (θ| η) of
firms of these types, the weight attached to this motive is F (θ| η) . The trade-
off is optimally resolved by having all firms except the most efficient one price
above marginal costs; the most efficient one prices exactly at marginal costs.
Moreover, given our standard assumptions that the type distribution has full
support and the surplus function satisfies the boundary condition (2) , all types
produce a strictly positive quantity at the optimum; that is, excluding firms is
not optimal.
3.1 Comparative Statics
We now establish some important comparative statics properties of the solution.
In particular, it is interesting to see how the quality and quantity schedules
depend on η. To this end we write virtual surplus as B (x, q, θ, η) , to emphasize
its dependence on η. The following lemma gathers again some useful facts.
Lemma 3 i) B (x, q, θ, η) has non-decreasing (non-increasing) differences in
(x, q) and η for given θ if and only if F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is non-increasing (non-decreasing)
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in η.
ii) If (η, θ) are affiliated, then F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is non-increasing in η. If (−η, θ) are affil-
iated, then F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is non-decreasing in η.
We can now state how the solution of the regulation problem depends on η :
Proposition 2 i) Suppose that (η, θ) are affiliated, so that F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is non-increasing
in η. Then, if B (x, q, θ, η) is supermodular in (x, q) for each θ, η, x∗ (θ; η) and
q∗ (θ; η) are both non-decreasing in η;
ii) Suppose that (−η, θ) are affiliated, so that F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is non-decreasing in η.
Then, if B (x, q, θ, η) is submodular in (x, q) for each θ, η, x∗ (θ; η) is non-
increasing in η and q∗ (θ; η) is non-decreasing in η.
The intuition for these results is as follows. If (η, θ) are affiliated, then,
the higher is η, the lower is F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) . Hence, the rent extraction motive receives
a smaller weight in the government’s objective function. Hence, the induced
quantity that consumers purchase is higher at the optimum. When in addition
x and q are complements, then this implies that the quality should also be weakly
higher the higher is η. The intuition for the second case is reversed, as far as
the quantity of consumption is concerned. But since x and q are substitutes in
this case, again the quality is non-decreasing in η.
Obviously, there are four possible combinations of affiliation assumptions and
supermodularity assumptions on B (x, q, θ, η) . However, we can deal in general
only with those cases where the implied change in quality as a response to an
increase in η is non-negative. The reason is that the constraint set depends
on η. In particular, it is expanding with an increase in η, and hence monotone
comparative statics methods cannot be used to establish results where q∗ (θ; η)
is non-increasing in η. In particular, if q∗ (θ; η) is at a corner solution for both
a low and a high value of η, then q∗ (θ; η) must obviously be increasing in η for
some η even though the marginal incentive to increase quality may be lower for
the higher value of η.
However, interesting exceptions to this negative conclusion are when the
constraint set is either “high enough” or “low enough”for any value of η in a
sense we make precise below. In particular, the former case arises when η is
sufficiently high.3 In this case, we can apply direct methods to the pair of
first-order conditions (21) and (22) . In particular, if the inverse hazard rate
F (θ|η )
f(θ|η ) is differentiable in η, the solution schedules x
∗ (θ; η) and q∗ (θ; η) are
both differentiable in η.
3We note that while the differentiability of surplus with respect to q was not essential for
our results to this point, it is essential for the remaining ones in this section.
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Proposition 3 Let η be sufficiently high so that the solution satisfies q∗ (θ; η) <
η for all θ, η. Then,
i) If η and θ are affiliated, then x∗ (θ; η) is non-decreasing in η for each θ. If
−η and θ are affiliated, then x∗ (θ; η) is non-increasing in η for each θ.
ii) If B (x, q, θ, η) is supermodular in q and x for all θ, η, then signdq
∗
dη =
signdx
∗
dη . If B (x, q, θ, η) is submodular in q and x for all θ, η, then sign
dq∗
dη =
−signdx∗dη .
Another interesting case is when η is sufficiently small. In that case, the
capacity constraint is binding for all types, so that q (θ, η) = η for all θ, η. We
can again apply direct differentiability methods to find that:
Proposition 4 Let η be sufficiently small so that the solution satisfies q∗ (θ; η) =
η for all θ, η. If B (x, q, θ, η) is supermodular in q and x for all θ, η and η and θ
are affiliated, then x∗ (θ; η) is non-decreasing in η for each θ; if B (x, q, θ, η) is
submodular in q and x for all θ, η and −η and θ are affiliated, then x∗ (θ; η) is
non-increasing in η for each θ.
Thus, our model allows for clear comparative statics predictions in a wide
range of settings. These comparative statics results are important building
blocks of the multi-dimensional regulation problem, to which we now turn.
4 The Two-dimensional Problem
We now address the problem when both θ and η are unobservable to the reg-
ulator. Remarkably, our problem allows for a complete characterization of the
optimum in a variety of cases, despite there being two dimensions of asymmetric
information. Even more remarkable, the solution coincides with the one found
in the one-dimensional case under natural assumptions. In these cases, asym-
metric information about η is irrelevant as there are no misaligned interests with
respect to this dimension. We start by making some basic observations about
the implications of incentive compatibility in our model
4.1 Incentive Compatibility
The basic obstacle multi-dimensional screening problems face is that the number
of deviations to consider is simply too large to deal with. This is a striking
difference to our problem where the number of constraints is simply the “sum”
of constraints in each dimension alone. To derive this fundamental result, we
first state a technical preliminary needed in the proof of the result.
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Lemma 4 Let η′ < η′′ and θ′ < θ′′ < θ′′′ and suppose q (θ, η′′) ≤ η′ for θ ∈
[θ′, θ′′′] . Then, for all (θ, η) ∈ {η′, η′′} × [θ′, θ′′′] and all
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
∈ {η′, η′′} ×
[θ′, θ′′′] :
i)
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
− x (θ, η)
)(
θˆ − θ
)
≤ 0; and
ii) if x (θ, η′) is continuous in θ at θ′′, then x (θ′′, η′′) = x (θ′′, η′) ; moreover
iii) Π(θ, θ, η′) = Π (θ, θ, η′′)
Part i) of the Lemma is a straightforward generalization of the monotonicity
properties of incentive compatible solutions in one dimension. The difference
is that η is allowed to vary as well. As is well known, monotonic functions
are continuous almost everywhere. Hence, part ii) applies almost everywhere,
stating that bunching of quantity schedules will arise if two types (θ, η′) and
(θ, η′′) both produce qualities that are feasible for both types. Finally, part iii)
says that if types (θ, η′) and (θ, η′′) can mimic each other, then their profits
must be the same. Using these properties, we can now show that a mechanism
is incentive compatible if and only if no type has any incentive to misrepresent
his type in one dimension at a time.
Lemma 5 The incentive constraint (5) is satisfied if and only if the constraints
Π(θ, θ, η) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ, η
)
for all θˆ (25)
and
Π(θ, θ, η) ≥ Π(θ, θ, ηˆ) for all ηˆ such that q (θ, ηˆ) ≤ η (26)
are satisfied.
The intuition for the result is quite straightforward. Since costs are addi-
tively separable in a part related to quality and quantity, and in a part related
to quantity and the firm’s cost parameter θ, the firm’s incentive to misrepresent
its cost parameter θ depends solely on the quantity allocation. The intuition
why only the one-dimensional constraints are relevant is best seen in the case
where a type (θ, η) considers mimicking a type
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
with ηˆ < η. The profit
type (θ, η) obtains this way is Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
, just the same profit type (θ, ηˆ) obtains
when it mimics type
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
. But by (25) applied to type (θ, ηˆ) , we know that it
would be better to state the true cost parameter θ, so Π (θ, θ, ηˆ) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
.
But then, by constraint (26) , being truthful about the quality capacity would
result in an even higher profit. Using Lemma 4 above, we can generalize this
insight also to the case where the type mimicked,
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, is such that ηˆ > η. If
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the deviation is feasible in the first place, then the quantity allocation and the
profit must be exactly the same as if type
(
θˆ, η
)
was mimicked. But then, by
(25) , this deviation gives rise to a profit that is weakly lower than the profit
obtained by being truthful.
The crucial property of the problem that allows us to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the problem in this way is that the profit Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
depends only
on messages and the true cost parameter, but not on the true quality capacity
parameter.
Building on the Lemmas four and five, we can bring the incentive con-
straints into a more tractable form. Let Λ
(
θˆ, θ, η
)
≡
{
θˆ, ηˆ : q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η
}
and
let pi (θ, η) ≡ maxθˆ,ηˆ∈Λ(θˆ,θ,η) Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
.
Lemma 6 The incentive and participation constraints are satisfied if and only
if i)
t (θ, η) = C (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ)+pi (θ, η)−p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) ,
(27)
where
pi (θ, η) = pi
(
θ, η
)
+
θ∫
θ
cy (X (p (y, η) , q (θ, η)) , y) dy (28)
and X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) is non-increasing in θ for all η and pi
(
θ, η
) ≥ 0 for all
η,
ii) pi (θ, η) is non-decreasing in η for all θ and
iii) if for η′ < η′′ q (θ, η′′) ≤ η′ then pi (θ, η′) = pi (θ, η′′) and X (p (θ, η′) , q (θ, η′)) =
X (p (θ, η′′) , q (θ, η′′)).
We can compute the rent of a firm of type (θ, η) by summing the rent of the
most inefficient cost type for a given quality capacity, pi
(
θ, η
)
, and the marginal
changes of the firm’s rent with respect to changes in its cost parameter θ. Notice
that (28) allows for the case where pi
(
θ, η
)
> 0, so some high cost types may
receive rents. Apart from this, we can essentially use the same procedure as
in Lemma 1. There are additional conditions, ii) and iii) in the lemma, that
are introduced through incentive compatibility conditions in the η dimension.
ii) requires that the firm’s rent must be non-decreasing in η; this is required
because mimicking a firm with a lower η is - by technical feasibility of the quality
allocation - always possible. Condition iii) summarizes the essence of Lemma 4;
if two types with the same cost parameter θ but different quality capacities can
mimic each other, then they must receive the same rent and they must produce
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the same quantities. This final condition in the Lemma is somewhat difficult
to treat analytically. The problem is that the regulator’s ability to implement
distinct quantity schedules for firms of the same cost but with different quality
capacities depends on the allocation of quality for these firms. Thus, to solve the
problem, we need to have a good guess about the quality allocation. Before we
turn to this question, it is worth discussing some important differences between
this problem and other problems of multi-dimensional screening.
A crucial obstacle the multi-dimensional screening problem faces is that there
is no natural order of types (see Rochet and Chone´ (2003). In their problem it
would not make sense to compute the rent of a firm simply by integrating up
from the most inefficient type for each given η. A deviation of a type (θ, η) to
some statement
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
must be ruled out irrespective of the particular path con-
necting (θ, η) and
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
. In our problem, only orthogonal incentive constraints
play a role, and only those in the θ-dimension are necessarily binding at the
optimum. Using these binding incentive constraints, we obtain conditions (27)
and (28) . Incentive compatibility in the η dimension is then a relatively simple
monotonicity condition in the η dimension.
4.2 The optimal allocation of quality
Recall from our analysis of the first-best allocation that the first-best opti-
mal quality allocation, qfb (θ, η), satisfies either condition (10) or (11) given
the optimal pricing schedule pfb (θ, η) . Define the quality allocation schedule
qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η)) as one satisfying either condition (10) or (11) , but for an arbi-
trary pricing schedule p (θ, η) . The schedule qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η)) provides a lower
bound on the second best allocation:
Proposition 5 An optimal second-best allocation entails q∗ (θ, η) ≥ qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η))
for all θ, η.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Given additive separability of
the cost function, the regulator can just compensate the firm for its additional
cost if it is asked to provide higher quality. The regulator does not have to
pay more than the increase in pure economic costs, precisely because there
is no interaction between q and θ in the firm’s cost function; hence the firm’s
informational rent with respect to its information θ is not affected by changes in
the quality allocation. In addition to that, one needs to be sure that changing
the quality allocation does not open new deviation possibilities for the firm.
Clearly, that is true if we raise the quality allocation pointwise, starting from
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an allocation below the first-best one for a given pricing rule. The reason is
that such a change makes deviations for the firm more difficult, so if the initial
allocation is incentive compatible, the new one is as well. Additive separability
of the cost function is obviously crucial for this result. If the cost function were
not additively separable in θ and q, then changing the allocation would change
the agent’s incentive to mimic other types.
We are now ready to characterize the complete solution to the regulation
problem in a number of cases.
5 Tractable Cases
Interesting cases that can be studied are the extreme cases where the optimal
quality schedule satisfies either q∗ (θ, η) ≤ η for all (θ, η) , or q∗ (θ, η) = η for
all (θ, η) . The former case arises as part of an optimum if η is sufficiently large;
the latter case arises as part of an optimum when η is sufficiently small.
5.1 The Case of η small
Proposition five suggests a simple solution procedure for the case where the
highest capacity for quality is small. In particular, let η be so small that all types
are constrained for some pricing schedule p (θ, η), that is qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η)) = η
for all θ, η. Of course, this argument involves some circularity, because we really
need qfb (θ, η; p∗ (θ, η)) = η for all θ, η, where p∗ (θ, η) is the optimal pricing
schedule, which is not known to begin with. However, for η small enough, the
capacity constraint must become binding for all types at the optimal pricing
schedule. To show this, we solve the problem assuming that q∗ (θ, η) = η for all
θ, η. Using the pricing schedule that is optimal for this quality allocation rule,
we can verify from the solution that it satisfies qfb (θ, η; p∗ (θ, η)) = η for all
θ, η.
A binding capacity constraint simplifies the problem dramatically. By def-
inition, the feasibility constraint is always met. Moreover, types will only be
tempted to mimic downwards in the η dimension, but not upwards. Hence,
pi (θ, η) must be non-decreasing in η to rule out downward deviations. With
q (θ, η) = η for all θ, η, problem (4) subject to (5) , (6) , and (7) , is equivalent
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to the problem
max
x(·;·),pi(θ,·)
EH
 θ∫
θ
[
V (x (θ, η) , η)− C (x (θ, η) , η, θ)
]
f (θ |η ) dθ
 (29)
−EH
 θ∫
θ
[
(1− α)
(
pi
(
θ, η
)
+ cθ (x (θ, η) , θ)
F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)]
f (θ |η ) dθ

s.t. x (θ, η) non-increasing in θ for all η and (30)
pi
(
θ, η
)
+
θ∫
θ
cy (x (y, η) , y) dy non-decreasing in η for all θ. (31)
We now show that, given certain restrictions on the joint distribution of char-
acteristics, the agent has no incentive to mimic another type who produces a
lower quality level. Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 6 If η is sufficiently small and η and θ are affiliated and B (x, q, θ, η)
is supermodular in q and x for all θ, η then unobservability of η does not affect
the solution to the principal’s problem. Formally, the solution is given the quality
schedule q (θ, η) = η for all (θ, η) , by the pricing schedule (24) and the transfer
schedule (17) .
The formal proof of this statement is omitted, since the argument is obvious.
Indeed, suppose one solves problem (29) under the assumptions in the Propo-
sition, neglecting both constraints (30) and (31) and setting pi
(
θ, η
)
= 0 for all
η. By Proposition 4, the optimal quantity schedule arising from this problem,
x∗ (θ, η) , will be non-decreasing in η for each θ. But then, constraint (31) will
automatically be satisfied at x∗ (θ, η) . Moreover, x∗ (θ, η) is monotonic in θ as
required by (30) . Hence, the procedure picks up the solution to the full problem
including its constraints (30) and (31) .
The intuition is quite simple: there is no conflict of interest with respect to η.
It is optimal from the regulator’s perspective to let higher η types produce more,
because x and q are complements in the social surplus function, and because
the higher is η the higher is f(θ|η )F (θ|η ) , so the greater is the weight given to the
principal’s efficiency motive as opposed to the motive to limit the firm’s rents.
Hence, higher η types receive larger rents so they have no incentive to report a
lower value of η.
The case where −η and θ are affiliated and B (x, q, θ, η) is submodular in
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q and x for all θ, η is considerably harder to tackle analytically. However, a
natural conjecture is the extreme opposite of the result in Proposition 6: we
expect that types with the same θ but different η will be bunched together for
all θ. Showing this for the general case requires quite heavy use of variational
methods. However, the intuition can be gained by looking at a special case of
our model, assuming that the cost function takes the form c (x, θ) = θx and
that there are only two levels of η, i.e., η ∈ {η, η} .
Constraint (31) takes the form
pi +
θ∫
θ
x (y, η) dy ≥
θ∫
θ
x
(
y, η
)
dy for all θ, (32)
where pi ≡ pi (θ, η) and where we have set pi (θ, η) = 0 as there is no reason to
leave a rent to the firm of type
(
θ, η
)
. It is less clear that pi = 0 is also opti-
mal; when setting pi, the regulator faces a trade-off between separating firms
with different quality capacities and extracting rents from high quality capacity
producers. To see this, it is useful to think of a two-step procedure where we
compute the optimal quantity schedules first for any given pi and search for the
optimal pi in a second step. Let x∗
(
θ; η
)
and x∗ (θ; η) denote the optimal sched-
ules conditional on η. Given submodularity and affiliation of −η, θ, Proposition
4 shows that x∗
(
θ; η
) ≥ x∗ (θ; η) for all θ. Define
pi ≡
θ∫
θ
x∗
(
y; η
)
dy −
θ∫
θ
x∗ (y; η) dy.
For pi ≥ pi, offering x∗ (θ; η) and x∗ (θ; η) is incentive compatible, and thus
optimal. Hence, offering a rent of pi to firm
(
θ, η
)
allows the regulator to tailor
the quantity schedule to the firm’s η-type, because (31) is slack at the optimum.
For 0 < pi < pi, the constraint (32) must be binding for some θ. If it were not
binding for any θ, then the solution would be the two schedules x∗
(
θ; η
)
and
x∗ (θ; η) ; but since pi < pi, this leads to a contradiction. Take now any two
schedules x
(
θ, η
) ≥ x (θ, η) , where the inequality is strict for some θ. Suppose
there is θ̂ > θ such that (32) holds as an equality at θ = θ̂. For any θ < θ̂, the
incentive constraint can be written as
bθ∫
θ
x (y, η) dy ≥
bθ∫
θ
x
(
y, η
)
dy
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Since x
(
θ, η
) ≥ x (θ, η) , this inequality can only hold if x (θ, η) = x (θ, η)
for θ < θ̂. That is, there must be bunching of types
(
θ, η
)
and (θ, η) for all
θ < θ̂. Thus, heuristically speaking, the regulator faces a trade-off between rent
extraction and separation. Increasing pi allows the regulator to solve the rents-
versus-efficiency trade-off within firms of the same quality capacity but with
different marginal costs in a better way, in the sense that constraint (32) is
binding on a smaller set of types.
Even though looking at the special case simplifies our problem a great deal,
the resulting control problem is still hard to solve. In particular, the problem
involves two state variables and derivatives of first and second order. Neverthe-
less we are able to characterize a local optimum, which entails pi∗ = 0. In turn,
this implies that there is bunching of all
(
θ, η
)
and (θ, η) types for all θ. Let
f (θ) ≡ EH [f (θ |η )] and let F (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
f (y) dy.
Proposition 7 Suppose that η is sufficiently small and −η and θ are affiliated
and B (x, q, θ, η) is submodular in q and x for all θ, η and let c (x, θ) = θx
and η ∈ {η, η} . Then, a local solution to the regulation problem involves the
quality schedule q∗ (θ, η) = η for all (θ, η) and pi∗ = 0. If in addition F (θ)f(θ) is
non-decreasing, then the quantity schedule satisfies
EH|θ [Vx (x∗ (θ) , η)− Cx (x∗ (θ) , η, θ) | Θ = θ]− (1− α) F (θ)
f (θ)
= 0. (33)
Around pi = 0, a marginal increase in pi has two effects. On the one hand,
all types (θ, η) receive a higher rent. Letting β denote the probability that
η = η, the expected welfare cost of increasing pi is β (1− α) . On the other
hand, increasing pi allows the regulator to tailor the quantity schedules to the
conditional distributions of θ given η on a small interval of high cost types.
However, the length of this interval goes to zero as pi goes to zero, which means
that the measure of types that can be separated this way goes to zero as well.
Hence, the costs of increasing pi outweigh the costs for small values of pi. As
a result the quantity schedule is optimized against an average distribution of
types; more precisely, the marginal distribution of θ.
We emphasize that - in contrast to all other results in this paper - Proposition
7 characterizes a local optimum instead of a global optimum. To show this, we
merely have to demonstrate that increasing pi away from zero results in a welfare
loss to the principal. This can be done because we can completely characterize
the solution to the regulation problem for pi = 0 by the quantity and quality
schedules given in the Proposition 6. In contrast, for a positive pi smaller than
pi, there is necessarily bunching in the classical sense, that is across some types
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with different θ but the same η. This makes it hard to characterize the gain
from a further increase in pi.
5.2 The case of η large
When η is large enough, the parameter η loses its relevance altogether: the
solution schedules for quality, price and transfer all become independent of η.
To see this formally, simply observe that when q (θ, η) ≤ η, we can apply Lemma
4 to all types (θ, η) . Hence, it follows that for each θ, x (θ, η) and pi (θ, η) must
be independent of η. Consider now the quality schedule. It is easy to see that
the schedule must satisfy the condition q∗ (θ, η) = qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η)) for all θ, η.
While Proposition 5 only provided a lower bound on the quality allocation,
this bound must be tight if q∗ (θ, η) < η for all θ, η. The reason is as follows.
In Proposition 5 we can only derive a lower bound on the quality allocation,
because we must make sure that we do not introduce additional possibilities for
deviations for any type. If we increase the quality schedule pointwise, we will
never increase these possibilities, but will at most reduce them or leave them the
same. But among allocations where every type can mimic any other type, this
caveat is irrelevant, and we can extend the argument in the proof of Proposition
5 to show that q∗ (θ, η) > qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η)) cannot arise at an optimum either.
Hence, it follows that q∗ (θ, η) = qfb (θ, η; p (θ, η)) for all θ, η. We can now again
solve our problem by conjecturing that q∗ (θ, η) = qfb (θ, η; p∗ (θ, η)) < η for all
θ, η and verify the conjecture from the optimal pricing schedule that arises as a
solution to the problem this way. If q∗ (θ, η) = qfb (θ, η; p∗ (θ, η)) < η for all θ, η,
then, by part iii of Lemma 6, x∗ (θ, η) must be independent of η. But if x∗ (θ, η)
is independent of η, q∗ (θ, η) must be independent of η as well. In other words,
the optimal allocation involves complete bunching in the η dimension for each
θ. We can then state:
Proposition 8 For the case where η is large, suppose F (θ)f(θ) is non-decreasing
in θ. Then, the optimal quantity schedule satisfies(
Vx (x∗ (θ) , q (θ))− Cx (x∗ (θ) , q (θ) , θ)− (1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) F (θ)
f (θ)
)
= 0,
(34)
and the optimal quality schedule satisfies
Vq (x (θ) , q∗ (θ))− Cq (x (θ) , q∗ (θ) , θ) = 0. (35)
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We omit a formal proof of the statement, since it follows in an obvious way
from our previous results. To complete the argument one can verify that q∗ (θ)
as defined by (35) satisfies q∗ (θ) < η for all θ when η is large enough.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. If the capacity constraint
on q is never binding for any type, the regulator does not need to have this
information, because the optimal allocation cannot depend on it. All types can
mimic others both by exaggerating their quality capacity and by understating it.
But then, to keep firms from misrepresenting their quality capacity, the firms’
profits must be independent of η for each θ. Hence, the total cost of serving
customers does not depend on η. But if all firms with the same θ receive the
same profits, then it is also optimal to offer them the same allocation, that is
to make them produce identical quality, quantity bundles.
The quantity schedules in Propositions 6 through 8 demonstrate that pricing
is always weakly above marginal costs, despite the fact that the firm is better
informed about two parameters rather than one. Since the crucial difference
between the Lewis and Sappington [1988] model and ours is the verifiability
assumption on realized demand, we conclude this verifiability assumption is
what ultimately drives their result. Moreover, since Armstrong [1999] must
maintain the same verifiability assumption to demonstrate that exclusion of
some low-demand-high-cost firms is optimal in the Lewis and Sappington model,
and we do not find exclusion at the optimum of our model, we conclude that
the verifiability assumption is also at the heart of the exclusion result in the
present context.4
6 Concluding Remarks
We have solved a regulation problem featuring two dimensional asymmetric
information in some detail. We have shown that the qualitative features of
optimal allocations in previous studies by Lewis and Sappington [1988] and
Armstrong [1999] depend crucially on verifiability assumptions that might not
hold in practice. Under our alternative verifiability conditions, pricing is always
weakly above marginal costs and no firm is excluded. We have solved our
problem completely for the case of extreme quality allocations, where firms
are either always producing at capacity or never constrained by their capacity
bounds. We leave an exploration of less extreme cases to future work.
One of our results, that under some conditions asymmetric information
4We want to emphasize that our critique of verifiability assumptions does not apply to
Armstrong [1996], where exclusion is a robust phenomenon.
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about one dimension of the problem is irrelevant, has also been found in other
contexts. Malakhov and Vohra [2005a,2005b] and Iyengar and Kumar [2006]
have studied auction problems where bidders’ valuations and capacities for con-
sumption are unknown. They show that the solution to the problem when only
valuations are private information remains incentive compatible when the sec-
ond dimension of private information is added. Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay
[2008] have first obtained a result in the spirit of Proposition 6 of the present
paper. The main difference between the Malakhov/Vohra and Iyengar/Kumar
approaches to our own is as follows. In their problem the principal has two
choice variables, and one of them - the quantity allocated to an agent - interacts
non-trivially with the agent’s types. In contrast, our results apply to problems
where the principal has three choices to make and two of them - the quantity
and the quality allocated to the agent - interact non-trivially with the agent’s
types. Taken together, these results demonstrate the usefulness of the model
structures to obtain insights into the problem of multi-dimensional screening.
In ongoing work, we apply our approach to a problem proposed by Che and
Gale [2000] where the seller faces possibly budget-constrained buyers.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We begin showing that X (p (y; η) , q (θ; η)) must be non-
increasing. Incentive compatibility requires that type (θ; η) has no incentive to
mimic type
(
θˆ; η
)
t (θ; η) + p (θ; η)X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η))− C (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ)
≥ t
(
θˆ; η
)
+ p
(
θˆ; η
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θ
)
and that type
(
θˆ; η
)
has no incentive to mimic type (θ; η)
t
(
θˆ; η
)
+ p
(
θˆ; η
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θˆ
)
≥ t (θ; η) + p (θ; η)X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η))− C
(
X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θˆ
)
.
Summing these inequalities gives
C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θ
)
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θˆ
)
≥ C (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ)− C
(
X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θˆ
)
.
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Writing as integrals, we have
θ∫
θˆ
Cz
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, z
)
dz ≥
θ∫
θˆ
Cz (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , z) dz.
Since Cqθ = 0, this is equivalent to
θ∫
θˆ
cz
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, z
)
dz ≥
θ∫
θˆ
cz (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , z) dz.
Given that cxθ ≥ 0 this requires for θ > θˆ that X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
≥
X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) .
Since X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) is monotonic in θ it is differentiable almost every-
where in θ. Then, by the envelope theorem, almost everywhere
piθ (θ; η) = −Cθ (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ) = −cθ (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , θ) .
Since piθ (θ; η) < 0, the participation constraint must be binding for type θ, so
pi
(
θ; η
)
= 0. Thus, we can write
pi (θ; η) =
θ∫
θ
cy (X (p (y; q (y; η)) , q (y; η)) , y) dy.
Since pi (θ; η) = t (θ; η)+p (θ; η)X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η))−C (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ) ,
we can write
t (θ; η) = C (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , q (θ; η) , θ)
+
θ∫
θ
cy (X (p (y; η) , q (y; η)) , y) dy − p (θ; η)X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) ,
which is the expression (17) given in the Lemma.
Consider now the sufficiency part. Almost everywhere Πθˆ
(
θˆ, θ; η
)∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= 0.
Differentiating totally with respect to θˆ and θ, and equating dθˆ = dθ, we find
Πθˆθˆ
(
θˆ, θ; η
)∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= − Πθˆθ
(
θˆ, θ; η
)∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
.
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Since
− Πθˆθ
(
θˆ, θ; η
)∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= cθx (X (p (θ; η) , q (θ; η)) , θ)
dX
dθ
≤ 0,
we find that the single crossing condition in conjunction with dXdθ ≤ 0 implies
that the local second order condition is satisfied. Finally, consider non-local
deviations to θˆ. We can write
Π
(
θˆ, θ; η
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θˆ; η
)
+C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θˆ
)
−C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θ
)
.
Hence, incentive compatibility requires that
Π (θ, θ; η) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θˆ; η
)
+C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θˆ
)
−C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θ
)
.
Subtracting Π
(
θˆ, θˆ; η
)
from both sides, substituting for pi (θ; η) and pi
(
θˆ; η
)
,
respectively, and using
θ∫
θˆ
piy (y; η) dy = −
θ∫
θˆ
cy (X (p (y; η) , q (y; η)) , y) dy,
we can write this as
−
θ∫
θˆ
cy (X (p (y; η) , q (y; η)) , y) dy
≥ C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θˆ
)
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, q
(
θˆ; η
)
, θ
)
.
Using additive separability of the cost function, we can substitute− ∫ θ
θˆ
cy
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, y
)
dy
for the difference on the right hand side. Rearranging the resulting inequality,
we have
θ∫
θˆ
cy
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
, y
)
dy ≥
θ∫
θˆ
cy (X (p (y; η) , q (y; η)) , y) dy.
For θˆ > θ, X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
≥ X (p (y; η) , q (y; η)) for all y ≤ θˆ, and hence
the inequality is satisfied. For θˆ < θ, X
(
p
(
θˆ; η
)
, q
(
θˆ; η
))
≤ X (p (y; η) , q (y; η))
for all y ≥ θˆ. Switching the lower and upper bound of integration yields the de-
sired insight.
26
Proof of Lemma 2. i) Recall that B (x, q, θ) is said to have non-decreasing
differences in (x, q) and θ if B (x, q, θ) − B (x, q, θ′) is non-decreasing in (x, q)
for every θ ≥ θ′. Given additive separability of the cost function, C (x, q, θ) =
c (x, θ) + k (x, q) , we have
B (x, q, θ)−B (x, q, θ′)
= c (x, θ′) + (1− α) cθ (x, θ′) F (θ
′ |η )
f (θ′ |η ) −
(
c (x, θ) + (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
,
which proves the result.
ii) We can write the difference in terms of integrals, as
θ∫
θ′
(
cτ (x, τ) + (1− α) cττ (x, τ) F (τ |η )
f (τ |η ) + (1− α) cτ (x, τ)
∂
∂τ
F (τ |η )
f (τ |η )
)
dτ.
Differentiating the integrand with respect to x, we find that
cτx (x, τ) + (1− α) cττx (x, τ) F (τ |η )
f (τ |η ) + (1− α) cτx (x, τ)
∂
∂τ
F (τ |η )
f (τ |η ) ≥ 0
implies that c (x, θ) + (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) has non-decreasing differences in x
and θ.
Proof of Proposition 1. i) are the first-order conditions resulting from
pointwise maximization of the integrand in (18) . ii) follows Topkis (1978); see
also Theorem 2.8.1 in Topkis (1998). iii) follows also from Theorem 2.8.1 in
Topkis (1998) when we maximize over x and qˆ. Finally, by Lemma 1, these con-
ditions characterize a monotonic quantity schedule x∗ (θ; η) ; hence the resulting
schedules are incentive compatible.
Proof of Lemma 3. i) We can write
B (x, q, θ, η)−B (x, q, θ, η′) = − (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η ) −
(
− (1− α) cθ (x, θ) F (θ |η
′ )
f (θ |η′ )
)
= (1− α) cθ (x, θ)
(
F (θ |η′ )
f (θ |η′ ) −
F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
,
Differentiating with respect to x, we have
∂
∂x
(B (x, q, θ, η)−B (x, q, θ, η′)) = (1− α) cxθ (x, θ)
(
F (θ |η′ )
f (θ |η′ ) −
F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
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ii) Recall that two random variables are affiliated if for θ ≥ θ′ and η ≥ η′
f (θ, η) f (θ′, η′) ≥ f (θ′, η) f (θ, η′) .
Dividing on both sides by g (η) g (η′) , where g (η) =
∫ θ
θ
f (θ, η) dθ and g (η′) =∫ θ
θ
f (θ, η′) dθ are the marginal densities, we can write
f (θ |η ) f (θ′ |η′ ) ≥ f (θ′ |η ) f (θ |η′ ) .
Integrating over θ′ between θ and θ we find
f (θ |η )F (θ |η′ ) ≥ F (θ |η ) f (θ |η′ ) .
Rearranging, we have
F (θ |η′ )
f (θ |η′ ) ≥
F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
which is, if F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is differentiable in η, equivalent to
∂
∂η
(
F (θ|η )
f(θ|η )
)
≤ 0. These
inequalities are reversed for the case where (−η, θ) are affiliated.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is a direct application of Theorem 2.3 part
ii) and remark 10 in Vives [1999]. i) is direct; to see ii) recall that B (x, qˆ, θ, η)
is supermodular in this case, which implies the result follows again from Vives
theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3. We split the proof into two parts. We demonstrate
our results first for the case where H =
[
η, η
]
, and extend them later to the
case where H is discrete.
The case where H =
[
η, η
]
: Differentiating (21) totally with respect to x, q,
and η, we get(
Vxx (x∗, q∗)− Cxx (x∗, q∗, θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗, θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
dx∗(36)
+ (Vxq (x∗, q∗)− Cxq (x∗, q∗, θ)) dq∗
= (1− α) cxθ (x∗, θ) ∂
∂η
F (θ |η )
f (θ |η ) dη.
Differentiating (22) totally with respect to x and q, we get
(Vqx (x∗, q∗)− Cqx (x∗, q∗, θ)) dx∗ + (Vqq (x∗, q∗)− Cqq (x∗, q∗, θ)) dq∗ = 0.
28
Rearranging, we have
dq∗ = − (Vqx (x
∗, q∗)− Cqx (x∗, q∗, θ))
Vqq (x∗, q∗)− Cqq (x∗, q∗, θ) dx
∗. (37)
Substituting from (37) for dq, using Young’s theorem, the additive separability
of the cost function, and rearranging, we get
dx∗
dη
=
(1− α) cxθ (x∗, θ) ∂∂η F (θ|η )f(θ|η )(
Vxx (x∗, q∗)− Cxx (x∗, q∗, θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗, θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) − (Vqx(x
∗,q∗)−kqx(x∗,q∗))2
(Vqq(x∗,q∗)−kqq(x∗,q∗))
) .
The denominator is negative by concavity of B (x, q, θ, η) in x, q. Hence, dx
∗
dη is
of the same sign as − ∂∂η F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) is. Hence, if ∂∂η F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) ≤ 0 (θ, η are affiliated),
then dx
∗
dη ≥ 0. Dividing both sides of (37) by dη we find that dq
∗
dη has the same
sign as dx
∗
dη has if B (x, q, θ, η) is supermodular in x, q, and has the opposite sign
if B (x, q, θ, η) is submodular in x, q.
The case where H is discrete: Consider η′, η′′ ∈ H with η′′ > η′. Let
z (γ) ≡ F (θ |η
′ )
f (θ |η′ ) + γ
(
F (θ |η′′ )
f (θ |η′′ ) −
F (θ |η′ )
f (θ |η′ )
)
for γ ∈ [0, 1] .
Since θ, η′, and η′′ are fixed, we write z (γ) for z (θ, η′, η′′, γ) . Observe that
z (0) ≡ F(θ|η
′ )
f(θ|η′ ) and z (1) ≡
F(θ|η′′ )
f(θ|η′′ ) . However, we define z (γ) for all γ ∈ [0, 1] ,
so that we can apply differentiability methods, and hence the implicit function
theorem. Define x∗ (θ; γ) as the solution to the equation
Vx (x∗ (θ; γ) , q (θ; γ))−Cx (x∗ (θ; γ) , q (θ; γ) , θ)−(1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ; γ) , θ) z (γ) = 0.
(38)
Notice that (38) is identically equal to (21) for γ ∈ {0, 1} , but (38) is well
defined and differentiable in γ for all γ ∈ [0, 1] . Similarly, define q∗ (θ; γ) as the
solution to the equation
Vq (x (θ; γ) , q∗ (θ; γ))− Cq (x (θ; γ) , q∗ (θ; γ) , θ) = 0. (39)
Notice again that (22) is identically equal to (22) , for γ ∈ {0, 1} , and is well
defined and differentiable in γ for all γ ∈ [0, 1] . Using the same steps as above
we have
dx∗
dγ
=
(1− α) cxθ (x∗, θ) zγ (γ)(
Vxx (x∗, q∗)− Cxx (x∗, q∗, θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗, θ) z (γ)− (Vqx(x∗,q∗)−kqx(x∗,q∗))
2
(Vqq(x∗,q∗)−kqq(x∗,q∗))
) .
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Noting that
1∫
0
dx∗
dγ
dγ = x∗ (θ, η′′)− x∗ (θ, η′) ,
we find
x∗ (θ, η′′)− x∗ (θ, η′)
=
1∫
0
(1− α) cxθ (x∗, θ) zγ (γ)
Vxx (x∗, q∗)− Cxx (x∗, q∗, θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗, θ) z (γ)− (Vqx(x∗,q∗)−kqx(x∗,q∗))
2
(Vqq(x∗,q∗)−kqq(x∗,q∗))
dγ.
Since the denominator is negative, we have
sign (x∗ (θ, η′′)− x∗ (θ, η′)) = sign
(
F (θ |η′ )
f (θ |η′ ) −
F (θ |η′′ )
f (θ |η′′ )
)
.
The sign of
(
F(θ|η′ )
f(θ|η′ ) −
F(θ|η′′ )
f(θ|η′′ )
)
is given by Lemma 3, part ii). Using (37) , we
can write
q∗ (θ, η′′)−q∗ (θ, η′) =
1∫
0
dq∗
dγ
dγ =
1∫
0
(
− (Vqx (x
∗, q∗)− Cqx (x∗, q∗, θ))
Vqq (x∗, q∗)− Cqq (x∗, q∗, θ)
dx∗
dγ
)
dγ
and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4. We consider the case where H =
[
η, η
]
. From (21)
for q∗ (θ; η) = η we have the first-order condition for x∗ (θ; η) :(
Vx (x∗ (θ; η) , η)− Cx (x∗ (θ; η) , η, θ)− (1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ; η) , θ) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
= 0
Differentiating totally with respect to x and η and rearranging, we get
dx∗
dη
=
(
Vxq (x∗ (θ; η) , η)− Cxq (x∗ (θ; η) , η, θ)− (1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ; η) , θ) ∂∂η F (θ|η )f(θ|η )
)
−
(
Vxx (x∗ (θ; η) , η)− Cxx (x∗ (θ; η) , η, θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗ (θ; η) , θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η )
) .
The proof for the case whereH is discrete using the same procedure as the proof
for Proposition 3, and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4. i) From the fact that q (θ, η′′) ≤ η′ for θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′′]
we know that any type (θ, η′) for θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′′] can mimic any type (θ, η′′) for
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θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′′] . Hence, incentive compatibility requires that
t (θ, η) + p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η))− C (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ)
≥ t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
and that type
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
has no incentive to mimic type (θ, η)
t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
≥ t (θ, η) + p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η))− C
(
X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θˆ
)
.
Summing these inequalities gives
C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
≥ C (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ)− C
(
X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θˆ
)
.
Writing as integrals, we have (using Cqθ = 0)
θ∫
θˆ
cz
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, z
)
dz ≥
θ∫
θˆ
cz (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , z) dz.
Given that cxθ ≥ 0 this requires for θ > θˆ that X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
≥
X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) . Switching to x (θ, η) notation, we have proven the first part
of the Lemma.
ii) Suppose x (θ, η′) is continuous in θ at θ′′. From our analysis of the one-
dimensional problem, we know that x (θ′, η′) ≥ x (θ′′, η′) ≥ x (θ′′′, η′) . Tak-
ing limits, we have, by continuity, limθ′↗θ′′ x (θ′, η′) = limθ′′′↘ x (θ′′′, η′) =
x (θ′′, η′) . We have just shown in part i) that x (θ′, η′) ≥ x (θ′′, η′′) ≥ x (θ′′′, η′) .
But, this can be true for all θ′ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ′′′ only if x (θ′′, η′) = x (θ′′, η′′) .
iii) For any θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′′] , q (θ, η′′) ≤ η′, and hence incentive compatibility for
type (θ, η′) requires that he has no incentive to mimic type (θ, η′′) , so
Π (θ, θ, η′) ≥ Π(θ, θ, η′′) .
For type (θ, η′′) , incentive compatibility requires that
Π (θ, θ, η′′) ≥ Π(θ, θ, η′) .
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Both inequalities can hold only if
Π (θ, θ, η′′) = Π (θ, θ, η′) .
Proof of Lemma 5. It is easy to see that the two one dimensional constraints
are necessary for incentive compatibility. We now show they are also sufficient
for incentive compatibility. Suppose a type (θ, η) mimics a type
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
with
q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η, so that the deviation is feasible for type (θ, η) . We will show that
(25), (26) , imply that such a deviation is suboptimal. There are two types of
deviations to consider. i) ηˆ ≤ η; ii) ηˆ > η.
The proof for case i) is very simple. By mimicking type
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, type (θ, η)
he obtains profit Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
≡ t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
−C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
. But by incentive compatibility for
type (θ, ηˆ) in the θ dimension, type (θ, η) could obtain more by mimicking
type (θ, ηˆ) , since
Π (θ, θ, ηˆ) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
.
But then, by incentive compatibility for type (θ, η) in the η dimension, we have
Π (θ, θ, η) ≥ Π(θ, θ, ηˆ) .
Hence, the deviation gives a weakly lower profit than announcing the true type.
ii) From the Lemma above x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
= x
(
θˆ, η
)
and Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, η
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, ηˆ
)
.
From (25) for type (θ, η) , we have
Π (θ, θ, η) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ, η
)
Now, using the additive separability of the cost function,
Π
(
θˆ, θ, η
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, η
)
+ c
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, η
)
, q
(
θˆ, η
))
, θˆ
)
− c
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, η
)
, q
(
θˆ, η
))
, θ
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, η
)
+ c
(
x
(
θˆ, η
)
, θˆ
)
− c
(
x
(
θˆ, η
)
, θ
)
.
Similarly, we can write
Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ c
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
− c
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
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Since Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, ηˆ
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θˆ, η
)
and x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
= x
(
θˆ, η
)
it follows that
Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
= Π
(
θˆ, θ, η
)
.
Hence, we have shown that Π (θ, θ, η) ≥ Π
(
θˆ, θ, η
)
implies also Π (θ, θ, η) ≥
Π
(
θˆ, θ, ηˆ
)
.
Proof of Lemma 6. By Lemma 5, the one dimensional constraints are
necessary and sufficient for the constraint ruling out two-dimensional deviations.
Applying the same procedure as in Lemma 1 to (25) , we get conditions (27)
and (28) . By Lemma 1 (27) and (28) in conjunction with monotonicity of X
are necessary and sufficient for (25) . ii) follows directly from (26) , because
mimicking a firm with a lower quality capacity is always feasible. iii) is simply
restating conditions ii) and iii) from Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 6. Take any incentive compatible allocation given by
the triple of schedules p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, and t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
for all θˆ, ηˆ. Suppose for
some θˆ, ηˆ, we have q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
< qfb
(
θˆ, ηˆ; p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
. Let Φ denote the set of
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
< qfb
(
θˆ, ηˆ; p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
. Then, we can change the allocation to
the new triple of schedules p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, and t˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
for all θˆ, ηˆ as follows.
We set q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
= qfb
(
θˆ, ηˆ; p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
for all
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, and set p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
such that
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
= X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
for all θˆ, ηˆ. For all
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
∈ Φ
we adjust the transfers from the initial transfers t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, to the new transfers
t˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
= t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
+C
(
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
.
We first show that the new allocation with the new transfers is incentive com-
patible. Then, we show that the surplus to the principal has increased under
the new allocation.
By assumption, the functions p, q and t are incentive compatible, that is for
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all θ, η and all θˆ, ηˆ such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η
t (θ, η) + p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η))− C (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ) (40)
≥ t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
.
Incentive compatibility of the new functions p˜, q˜, and t˜ is given if and only if for
all θ, η and all θˆ and all q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η
t˜ (θ, η) + p˜ (θ, η)X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η))− C (X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η)) , q˜ (θ, η) , θ) (41)
≥ t˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− C
(
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
.
Substituting for t˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, and simplifying, this amounts to
t (θ, η) + p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η))
+ C
(
X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η)) , q˜ (θ, η) , θ
)
− C
(
X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ
)
− C (X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η)) , q˜ (θ, η) , θ)
≥ t
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
+ p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
+ C
(
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
− C
(
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
.
Adding and subtracting C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
on the right-
hand side, and noting (40), the new incentive constraint is satisfied if
0 ≥ C
(
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
− C
(
X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
+ C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
− C
(
X
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
.
Using C (x, q, θ) = c (x, θ)+k (x, q) , andX
(
p
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
= X
(
p˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
≡
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x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, we can write this as
0 ≥ c
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
− c
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
+ c
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θ
)
− c
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, θˆ
)
+k
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− k
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
+ k
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
− k
(
x
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
, q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
))
= 0.
Hence (41) is satisfied.
Finally, the system is overall incentive compatible. This follows, because
the schedule q˜ (θ, η) is weakly higher than the schedule q (θ, η) , which implies
that the set of messages
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
such that q˜
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η is a subset of the set of
messages
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
such that q
(
θˆ, ηˆ
)
≤ η. Hence, for each type at most as many
deviations are feasible in the new system as in the old system.
Consider now the government’s surplus. By construction, the firm’s equilib-
rium payoffs are unchanged, as
t (θ, η) + p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η))− p˜ (θ, η)X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η))
+ C
(
X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η)) , q˜ (θ, η) , θ
)
− C
(
X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ
)
+ p˜ (θ, η)X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η))− C (X (p˜ (θ, η) , q˜ (θ, η)) , q˜ (θ, η) , θ)
= t (θ, η) + p (θ, η)X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η))− C
(
X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ
)
.
In other words, the firm is just compensated for the increase in his cost of
production, and the entire additional surplus goes to the principal. Hence,
holding the pricing schedule p (θ, η) constant, any allocation that satisfies
Vq
(
X
(
p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)
)
, q (θ, η)
)
− Cq (X (p (θ, η) , q (θ, η)) , q (θ, η) , θ) > 0
and q (θ, η) < η can be improved by raising q (θ, η) .
Proof of Proposition 7. Let β = Pr [η = η] . We will solve our problem in
two steps. In the first step we take pi as given and characterize optimal quantity
and quality schedules. In the second step we maximize with respect to the
choice pi.
For a given, non-negative value of pi smaller than pi, we can write our problem
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as
Γ (pi) = max
x(θ,η),x(θ,η)
β
 θ∫
θ
[
V (x (θ, η) , η)− C (x (θ, η) , η, θ)
]
f (θ |η ) dθ

−β
 θ∫
θ
[
(1− α)
(
pi + x (θ, η)
F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)]
f (θ |η ) dθ

+(1− β)
 θ∫
θ
[
V
(
x
(
θ, η
)
, η
)− C (x (θ, η) , η, θ)]f (θ ∣∣η ) dθ

− (1− β)
 θ∫
θ
[
(1− α)x (θ, η) F (θ ∣∣η )
f
(
θ
∣∣η ) ]f (θ ∣∣η ) dθ

s.t. xθ (θ, η) ≤ 0 and xθ
(
θ, η
) ≤ 0
θ∫
θ
x
(
y, η
)
dy −
θ∫
θ
x (y, η) dy ≤ pi
Let z ≡ − ∫ θ
θ
x
(
y, η
)
dy, z ≡ − ∫ θ
θ
x (y, η) dy, x
(
θ, η
)
= x = zθ, and x (θ, η) =
x = zθ. Moreover, let y = xθ (θ, η) and y = xθ
(
θ, η
)
. We can view this as a
control problem with Hamiltonian of the following form:
H =
(
V (x, η)− C (x, η, θ)− (1− α)xF (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
βf (θ |η )
+
(
V
(
x, η
)− C (x, η, θ)− (1− α)xF (θ ∣∣η )
f
(
θ
∣∣η )
)
(1− β) f (θ ∣∣η )
+λy + λy + κx+ κx
µ (pi − (z − z))
−ωy − ωy
Differentiating with respect to state variables, we get the conditions of optimal-
ity
∂H
∂z
= −µ = −κθ
∂H
∂z
= µ = −κθ
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and
∂H
∂x
=
(
Vx (x, η)− Cx (x, η, θ)− (1− α) F (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
βf (θ |η ) + κ = −λθ
∂H
∂x
=
(
Vx
(
x, η
)− Cx (x, η, θ)− (1− α) F (θ ∣∣η )
f
(
θ
∣∣η )
)
(1− β) f (θ ∣∣η )+ κ = −λθ
Moreover, the conditions of optimality with respect y and y are
∂H
∂y
= λ− ω = 0
and
∂H
∂y
= λ− ω = 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are ωy = 0, ω ≥ 0, y ≤ 0; and ωy = 0, ω ≥ 0, y ≤ 0.
Moreover, µ (pi − (z − z)) = 0 µ ≥ 0 and pi − (z − z) ≤ 0. The transversality
conditions are (since z (θ) and z (θ) are both free) κ (θ) = κ (θ) = 0, and λ (θ) =
λ
(
θ
)
= λ (θ) = λ
(
θ
)
= 0 (since both x and x are free at both bounds).
It follows directly from the transversality conditions for λ and λ, that
θ∫
θ
λθdθ =
θ∫
θ
λθdθ = 0.
Moreover, when ω (ω) = 0, λ (λ) = 0 as well.
Differentiating Γ (pi) with respect to pi, making use of the conditions above
(including
∫ θ
θ
λθdθ =
∫ θ
θ
λθdθ = 0), we can write
Γpi (pi) = −β (1− α) +
θ∫
θ
( (
λpi − ωpi
)
y + (λpi − ωpi) y + κpix+ κpix
+µpi (pi − (z − z)) + µ (1− (zpi − zpi))
)
dθ
= −β (1− α) +
θ∫
θ
(κpix+ κpix) dθ
Using the transversality conditions for κ (θ) and κ (θ) and the equations of
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motion for these costate variables, we get
κ (θ) = κ (θ) +
θ∫
θ
κτdτ =
θ∫
θ
µ (τ) dτ
and
κ (θ) = −
θ∫
θ
µ (τ) dτ
Hence,
κpi =
θ∫
θ
µpi (τ) dτ = −κpi.
When µ > 0, we have x = x. When µ = 0, we have x < x. (One can show this
easily, because the reverse would lead into a contradiction.) So, we can write
Γpi (pi) = −β (1− α) +
θ∫
θ
θ∫
θ
µpi (τ) dτ (x− x) dθ
For pi = 0, we have x = x for all θ. Hence,
Γpi (0) = −β (1− α) < 0.
With pi = 0, we can simplify the Hamiltonian to
H =
(
V (x, η)− C (x, η, θ)− (1− α)xF (θ |η )
f (θ |η )
)
βf (θ |η )
+
(
V
(
x, η
)− C (x, η, θ)− (1− α)xF (θ ∣∣η )
f
(
θ
∣∣η )
)
(1− β) f (θ ∣∣η )
+λy − ωy
where we have set x = x = x, and y = y = y. Moreover, since by definition
for x = x = x,
∫ θ
θ
xdy − ∫ θ
θ
xdy = 0 ≤ pi = 0, we can drop the z variables
from the problem. If F (θ)f(θ) is non-decreasing in θ, the monotonicity condition
on x is automatically satisfied. Neglecting this constraint, we get the first-order
condition in the proposition. Using the fact that concavity is preserved under
summation (and hence when taking expectations) it is easy to verify that the
quantity schedule characterized by the first-order condition is monotonic in θ,
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and hence incentive compatible.
Proof of Proposition 8. Totally differentiating (34) with respect to x, q and
θ, and using C (x, q, θ) = c (x, θ) + k (x, q) , we get(
Vxx (x∗ (θ) , q (θ))− Cxx (x∗ (θ) , q (θ) , θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) F (θ)
f (θ)
)
dx∗
+(Vxq (x∗ (θ) , q (θ))− kxq (x∗ (θ) , q (θ))) dq∗
=
(
cxθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) + (1− α) cxθθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) F (θ)
f (θ)
+ (1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) ∂
∂θ
F (θ)
f (θ)
)
dθ.
Totally differentiating (35) with respect to x and q, we get
(Vqx (x∗, q∗)− Cqx (x∗, q∗, θ)) dx∗ + (Vqq (x∗, q∗)− Cqq (x∗, q∗, θ)) dq∗ = 0.
Rearranging, we have
dq∗ = − (Vqx (x
∗, q∗)− Cqx (x∗, q∗, θ))
Vqq (x∗, q∗)− Cqq (x∗, q∗, θ) dx
∗. (42)
Substituting from (42) for dq, using Young’s theorem, the additive separability
of the cost function, and rearranging, we get
dx∗
dθ
=
cxθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) + (1− α) cxθθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) F (θ)f(θ) + (1− α) cxθ (x∗ (θ) , θ) ∂∂θ F (θ)f(θ)(
Vxx (x∗, q∗)− Cxx (x∗, q∗, θ)− (1− α) cxxθ (x∗, θ) F (θ|η )f(θ|η ) − (Vqx(x
∗,q∗)−kqx(x∗,q∗))2
(Vqq(x∗,q∗)−kqq(x∗,q∗))
) .
Hence, the solution is incentive compatible.
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